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CONFLICT OF LAWS UPON THE SUBJECT OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.
The basis of modern civilization is the home, and yet in no
field of the law is there more diversity in the various jurisdictions,
than is to be found on the subject of marriage and divorce. This
divergence of view is a source of so much evil that wide spread at-
tention is drawn to it, and various plans proposed for its removal.
The question may first be considered from the standpoint of
marriage in cases where there has been no previous divorce, and
thus no added complication.
As a broad general proposition, it may be said that a marriage
valid where made is valid everywhere, and if not valid in the place
of inception, it is valid nowhere. Were this the sole test, there
would be little trouble on this head. But this simple rule is varied
by circumstance, and troublesome questions arise. Should na-
tionality or citizenship of the parties play any part; and what is
the effect of public policy? Thus suppose a country where dual
marriages are legal, and a citizen of such country marries two wives
there. These two marriages are lawful where made. Suppose
such person travels to England with both wives, or with the second
wife? The English courts would certainly not recognize such sec-
ond marriage or give any effect to it, because such recognition
would be against the moral sense of the community. In this case,
the parties are all foreigners. But suppose an Englishman goes to
such foreign country, settles and marries again, living there happily
with both wives. In the event of his death, can the second, wife
claim dower in the husband's English real estate? It would seem
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not, and yet why should England concern herself with what takes
place in a foreign jurisdiction, and why does the fact that an Eng-
lishman has taken unto himself these two wives, one in the foreign
country, affect the question? Is the theory sound that a country
can order and control the actions of its people out of the jurisdic-
tion of such country? Possibly the safety of a country may de-
mand that such a purely personal law shall follow the citizen every-
wher as regards political duties, but what sound reason is there
for extending such an anomolous doctrine further? But suppose
again that a citizen of such foreign country dies leaving children
by such second marriage, both wives living at his-death, can such
children be treated as legitimate by the English Court if the ques-
tion comes before them? As they are legitimate in their home
country, it would seem probable that the English courts would
so recognize them, but what difference would it make if the father
were an Englishman? It ought not to change the result, as the
children of the second wife are legitimate in their home country,
but it is quite doubtful what the English Courts would say in that
case, and still more doubtful if both the wives were English women.
In 1853 a French man and woman were living in Paris. In
1854, the parties went to London and were there married in due
form. The woman was then twenty-two, and the man twenty-
nine, and the consent of the man's father was not obtained. By
the French law, if the woman is under twenty-five or the man
under thirty, the parents' consent must be obtained or certain for-
malities taken in France in lieu of such consent. This was not done.
In 1854, the woman began an action in France for the annulment
of the marriage on the ground of its nullity, and the French court
so decreed. In i86o, the woman, having taken up a residence in
England, petitioned the Court for a decree of nullity of marriage.
The petition was dismissed.' This unfortunate woman was thus
married in England, but single in France. On sound principle, it
would seem that the English court was correct, and the French
rule wrong, for how can .the French court properly follow its citi-
zens into England, and say what they shall or shall not do there.
As they were properly married in England, ought not the French
Court to recognize the validity of such marriage, precisely as they
would have done, had the couple been English.
The English House of Lords, however, in the well known case
i. Simouin v. Mallac, 2 Sev. and Tr. 67.
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of Brook v. Brook 2 looked at the question very differently, when
Englishmen were concerned. In that case in I85o, an Englishman
was duly, according to the laws of Denmark, married in Denmark
to an English woman, who was the lawful sister of the man's de-
ceased wife. Both were lawfully domiciled in England at the time,
and had merely gone to Denmark temporarily. The court held this
marriage void, and held that such marriages were prohibited to all
English domiciled persons wherever they might go. It was con-
tended that if such marriages were to be held contrary to the laws
of God, then such a marriage between two Danes, celebrated in
Denmark, must be contrary to the laws of God, and that, therefore,
if the parties to it were to go to England, they must be considered
as living in incestuous intercourse, and any issue as illegitimate.
To this the Court said: "But this is not so. We do not hold
the marriage to be void because it is contrary to the law of God,
but because our law has prohibited it on the ground of its being
contrary to God's law. It is our law which makes the marriage
void and not the law of God. And our law does not affect to in-
terfere with or regulate the marriages of any but those who are
subject to its jurisdiction." This does away with the idea that re-
fusal to recognize the marriage is based upon the ground of mo-
rality. If such a marriage is immoral for English people, it must be
equally so for Danes.
The reasoning of the case is not convincing, and one more
ground for confusion is added to those already existing. Suppose
an Englishman marries an American girl and she dies. He mar-
ries her sister in New York. That is clearly a lawful marriage
where celebrated. What would the English court say? In Broke
v. Broke, we have a couple lawfully married in Denmark, but un-
married in England. Should each remarry in England, such re-
marriages would be valid there, but, doubtless, void in Denmark,
and probably the second marriages would be treated as bigamy in
Denmark. This seems a preposterous result, but necessarily fol-
lows from the doctrine of a personal law which can stretch out
beyond the jurisdiction all over the world. The results are not
more preposterous than the theory.
In the United States, the courts generally sustain a marriage
which is valid where made, if no question of previous divorce is
involved, and in this respect, at least, has more uniformity than ex-
ists elsewhere, and a simpler and more satisfactory rule.
2. 9 House of Lords Cases, 193.
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Turning now to the question of divorce, still greater confu-
sion arises from the divergent views of different jurisdictions.
And first we have the rule adopted by some courts that citi-
zenship governs the question of divorce. According to this view,
the citizens of a given country are governed by its laws as to the
status of marriage, and can only dissolve such marriage by the laws
of their domicile, even though both spouses are in a foreign juris-
diction, and the divorce is according to its laws.
Again we find the rule that if one of the spouses takes up a
residence in any jurisdiction, a divorce may be obtained by such
spouse, although the other has never been within the jurisdiction
and there is only substituted service by publication.
It seems to be generally recognized that if neither of the
parties has an actual bona fide residence within a given territory,
there is no jurisdiction to declare the parties divorced.
Some illustrations will indicate the situations which may arise
in different cases.
A Rhode Island woman, while at school, married an English-
man. Subsequently the husband deserted her in Boston, and went
to Europe. The wife returned to her father's home in Rhode
Island, and after three or four years, not having heard from her hus-
band, and knowing nothing as to his whereabouts, brought an action
for divorce in the Rhode Island Courts. The husband was served
by publication only, and the divorce was granted. 3 A very similar
case arose in France, and the French Court granted a divorce to
the wife, a Frenchwoman, although the husband, a German, was
not within the jurisdiction, and his whereabouts unknown. 4
These cases seem reasonable, and would strike one as just.
But suppose the case of a woman married and living in Connecti-
cut. Her husband is a mercantile traveller, and often absent for
months at a time. He leaves his wife on one of these trips, and she
supposes they are still happily married. He takes up a three-
months residence in some far western state, obtains a divorce by
publication, and the wife, having no idea of any domestic trouble,
suddenly learns that she is divorced. Such cases have occurred.
But some states have refused to recognize such divorces, and
have held that the papers in the proceeding must be actually de-
livered to the absent spouse, and that constructive notice is not
3. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87.
4. Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 23 Clunet, 149.
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sufficient. The result is that the divorce is valid in some states,
and not in others. A man may have one legitimate wife in one
state, and another equally legitimate in another. This second mar-
riage is bigamy in one state, and lawful in another.
The crowning result is reached in the very recent United States
Supreme Court decision in the case of Haddock v. Haddock. In
this case, the couple were married in New York in 1868. The hus-
band at once left his wife, and took up residence in Connecticut,
where in 188I he procured a divorce by publication, and in 1882,
married another woman. In a proceeding brought by the first wife
in New York, the New York Court held that the Connecticut di-
vorce was void for want of jurisdiction and that the New York
woman was still the legal wife. The case was taken to the United
States Supreme Court on the constitutional ground that the New
York Court had failed to give full faith and credit to the Connec-
ticut judgment. The Supreme Court sustained the New York de-
cision, on the ground that the Connecticut Court had no jurisdic-
tion.
The result is singular. The Supreme Court determines solely
that the New York Court had not acted unconstitutionally. It
does not, of course, vacate the Connecticut divorce and second mar-
riage. Thus the Connecticut man has a lawful wife in New York,
as declared by both the New York and Federal Courts, while in
Connecticut she is not his lawful wife, but another woman is. If
the Connecticut pair come to New York, he is committing adultery,
and he appears to have committed bigamy, while if the New York
lawful wife should live with her husband in Connecticut, he would
be committing adultery.
It will not illuminate the matter to take up further decisions,
or to discuss the varying views of the different states or of
foreign nations.
The people of this country are fully awake to the danger of
the situation, and much thought is being given to the question. The
difficulties in the way are great. Were a Federal statute possible,
that would simplify the matter. But the Constitution gives no war-
rant for such legislation, and there seems small hope of a consti-
tutional amendment, although it is barely possible that public dis-
cussion might arouse a sufficient sentiment to accomplish this.
On other grounds it may even be doubted whether such amend-
ment is desirable. Many believe that the Federal Government is
taking too many state matters unto itself, as it is. There may be
hope of bringing about a uniformity of legislation in each state, but
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this is a tremendous undertaking, and when accomplished, the
chances are strong that judicial interpretation would soon bring
about divergence again, so that the remedy would not avail much.
This result seems to be gradually coming about in respect to the
recent/,attempt to unify by codification the Negotiable Instrument
Law, and the probabilities are much stronger that a divergence
would be brought about in the case of marriage and divorce laws.
Although the divergent views in foreign courts cause much
evil, yet there is not the crying need for change which exists in
the United States, because we have in one country numerous juris-
dictions, and the intercourse between the people of one country is
necessarily greater than between the people of foreign countries.
To some extent, the same difficulty exists in Great Britain, where
they have three distinct jurisdictions, viz., England, Ireland and
Scotland, with great difference of views and decisions, but these
three jurisdictions are nothing, compared with the courts of all
our states, territories and intermingled with them, all those of
our Federal system.
The effort of those seriously studying the matter among us is,
therefore, very wisely confined to the attainment of some uniform-
ity in the United States.
The people of each state naturally prefer their own system.
They have grown up under their own laws and these have become a
-part of their make-up and character. This is especially the case
in many of the older states, where there is less change of domicile
on the part of the influential portion of the population.
As marriage is a status affecting the very foundations of so-
ciety, necessarily it follows that a state will be tenacious of its
views, and will very likely insist that its citizens must conform to
its ideas on this subject, whether they act in its jurisdiction, or
within the territorial boundaries of some other state. It is hard for
any people to give up this feeling, and yet it seems that many diffi-
culties might be avoided, if this notion that citizenship or residence
must play some part should be abandoned. Already, it is very gen-
-erally recognized that a marriage celebrated in any state according
to the laws of that state, shall be valid anywhere in the United
States, without reference to the residence or citizenship of the
parties. Why should not the same rule prevail as to divorces?
Let each state decide for itself, what shall be requisite for divorce
within its borders, and let the universal requisite be that both
parties shall be within.the jurisdiction and served there, or the di-
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vorce shall not be granted. The fact that both parties are citizens
of a state should not give jurisdiction, unless both are within the
territorial jurisdiction at the time, and on the other hand, if the
parties are both within any state territorial jurisdiction, that ought
to be enough without any reference to citizenship or residence.
Let each state determine for itself whether any or what residence
should be necessary and also upon what grounds divorce shall be
granted. If any state becomes too lax in its views, then the weight
of general public opinion can be focussed upon such state, and re-
form induced in that way.
Of course this leaves many troublesome cases without relief.
Thus in the above case of Ditson v. Ditson, the deserted wife
would have no method of freeing herself. Again any unfaithful
spouse could prevent the penalty of divorce, by simply keeping out
of the state in Which the other might be.
All these unfortunates, however, would in that case have to
endure their marriage bonds for the general good of the commun-
ity. If the courts of this country would act upon this simple law
of jurisdiction over the person, through bodily presence in the
state, there would be no need for any legislation whatever. It may
well be said that it will be as difficult to bring about any such
uniformity of views, as to accomplish any of the other suggested
plans. It may be so, but again, such a result might be brought
about more easily than is supposed, and such a decision by the
United States Supreme Court, as the recent case of Haddock v.
Haddock, has great influence and may help immensely in accom-
plishing good results.
The limits of a magazine article preclude anything more than
a cursory glance at this great subject, nor is it possible to say any-
thing that has not already been stated in one form or another, but
when the Supreme Court calls sharp attention to the subject, it may
do us good again to review a few of the points involved.
Our home life, our civilization, the safety of our government
demands some settlement of these intolerable evils.
Clarence D. Ashley.
